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ABSTRACT 
Joshua G. Coyne: Equity Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Information Asymmetry in Private 
Lending 
(Under the direction of John R. M. Hand) 
 
In this study I hypothesize and find that the precision of the private information in sell-
side equity analysts’ earnings forecasts is associated with price and non-price characteristics of 
private debt. Using a measure of the precision of analysts’ private information following Barron 
et al. (1998) for a sample of loans issued to US firms between 1994 and 2012, I find that higher 
precision is associated with lower interest rates and a lower likelihood of collateralization, 
especially when accruals quality is low or the borrower has low credit quality. I then isolate the 
two sources of analysts’ private information (i.e., information-processing ability and information 
from management) and find that both are associated with preferable loan terms. I investigate the 
impact of one regulatory shock (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure) and one economic shock (i.e., 
the recent financial crisis). After Reg FD, the association between precision of analysts’ private 
information and loan terms declines while the association between quality of information from 
management and loan terms increases. During the financial crisis, analysts’ precision ceases to 
be correlated with loan terms, while the importance of information from management again 
increases. Overall, I conclude that analysts’ forecasts provide a useful input for decreasing 
information risk in private loans.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether the precision of the private information in analysts’ 
forecasts is associated with the terms of bank loans. Using a sample of loans from Dealscan 
issued to US firms between 1994 and 2012, I find that borrowers whose analysts release 
forecasts with higher precision of private information as defined by Barron et al. (1998) have 
loans with lower interest rate spreads and a lower likelihood of collateralization. 
I then extend this main result by investigating the importance of the precision of private 
information in analyst forecasts relative to three other signals available to banks when making 
lending decisions (i.e., credit ratings, financial reporting quality and interest coverage). In each 
of these tests I find that analyst precision is more highly correlated with loan terms when the 
signal is negative (i.e., no investment-grade credit rating, low accruals quality, insufficient 
interest coverage). 
Because private information available to an analyst has two components—information-
processing ability and information communicated privately to the analyst by managers— I use a 
proxy for the quality of information from management to isolate the association of each 
component with loan terms, and I find that both parts of analysts’ private information precision 
are associated with preferable loan terms. Because Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) 
represents a shock to the ability of analysts to access private information from management, I 
investigate whether these associations changed after the introduction of Reg FD. Following Reg 
FD, the correlation between analysts’ private precision and loan terms decreases in significance, 
while that of the quality of information from management and loan terms increases. In addition 
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to Reg FD, the financial crisis represents a shock to analysts’ information environment. I find 
that during the crisis the precision of analysts’ private information is no longer associated with 
either loan term. Furthermore, the correlation between the quality of information from 
management and loan terms again increases relative to the pre-crisis period. 
This study contributes to the literature on the information content of analysts’ forecasts. 
Prior studies collectively suggest that analysts’ reports are relevant for equity investment 
decisions. Past research has provided evidence that analyst forecasts are superior to time-series 
models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff 1978, Fried and Givoly 1982, Brown et al. 1987) and that a 
stronger association exists between market response and analyst forecasts than market response 
and forecasts using academics’ mathematical models (Schipper 1991). Lys and Sohn (1990) find 
that markets respond to analysts’ revisions, and Fried and Givoly (1982) find a stronger price 
response to more accurate analysts’ forecasts, which is consistent with analysts who issue more 
accurate forecasts providing more profitable recommendations (Loh and Mian 2006).  
This study furthers this line of research by being the first to investigate the information 
content of analysts’ reports in a private debt setting by documenting an association between 
analysts’ forecast quality and price (i.e., spread) and non-price (i.e., collateral) terms of private 
loans. The only other study to investigate such an association is by Mansi et al. (2011), in which 
the authors investigate the association between analyst forecast quality and bond spreads and 
conclude that higher forecast quality provides information to institutional investors regarding 
asset valuation, which is incremental to the information provided by credit scores and which 
results in lower bond spreads. This study differs from theirs in two important ways. First, Mansi 
et al. do not attempt to exclude the portion of analyst forecast quality that relies on the precision 
of public information, which is observable by other market participants. By focusing on the 
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precision of private information, I am able to identify the contribution of analysts’ information 
processing ability. Second, bondholders constitute outsiders, whereas throughout my sample 
period banks have private access to borrowers. The resulting information sets available to each 
group of debt holders may have very little overlap, and the conclusion that equity analyst reports 
are a useful component of the information set of bondholders does not necessarily extend to 
banks, especially post Reg FD when analysts’ private access to management was revoked. 
Despite banks having direct access to management, it is not necessary for analysts to 
have superior information in order to inform the lending process. Because analysts’ forecasts and 
recommendations are the result of generating private information from public, analysts can 
contribute unique signals that the bank cannot acquire from the borrowing firm. Furthermore, 
research indicates that management learns from equity prices (Chen et al. 2007), which provides 
evidence that outsiders can provide information to insiders. 
This study also contributes to the streams of literature on the effects of Reg FD and the 
financial crisis. Heflin et al. (2003) provide early evidence of the effects of Reg FD on analysts’ 
forecast quality and find no change relative to the pre-Reg FD period, but they do document an 
increase in voluntary firm disclosures. Monhanram and Sunder (2006) follow Barron et al. 
(1998) and decompose forecast quality into public and private precision and find that, although 
public precision does not change, private precision increases, and they conclude that information 
discovery by analysts has increased following Reg FD. Amiram et al. (2012), on the other hand, 
document a decrease in analysts’ ability to reduce information asymmetry following Reg FD. 
With respect to the financial crisis, Arand and Kerl (2012) and Amiram et al. (2013) conclude 
that analysts’ forecast quality decreased following the start of the crisis but that investor reliance 
on forecasts simultaneously increased. I add to this body of research by providing evidence of 
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the effect of these two shocks on the association between loan terms and two components of 
analysts’ private precision—precision of information-processing and quality of information from 
management. 
I begin with a sample of loans issued to US firms between 1994 and 2012 from the 
Dealscan database. For each loan facility, I select two loan terms from Bharath et al. (2008) (i.e., 
loan spread and an indicator for whether the loan is collateralized) as my proxies for the 
characteristics of the loan contract.1 
To conduct my initial test, I calculate the precision of analysts’ private information as 
modeled by Barron et al. (1998) and regress each loan term on this precision measure, as well as 
several loan and firm controls. In each case I find that higher precision prior to loan issuance is 
associated with preferable loan terms (i.e., lower spreads and lower likelihood of 
collateralization). 
I then extend this main result by investigating three scenarios to determine when analyst 
precision has a stronger association with loan terms. In the first scenario, I regress each loan term 
on analysts’ precision  separately for firms with and without an investment-grade credit rating 
prior to the loan issuance. In the second, I split the sample at the median for accruals quality. I 
construct a measure of accruals quality by combining three measures of abnormal accruals from 
prior research (i.e., Dechow et al. 1995, Teoh et al. 1998 and Dechow and Dichev 2002) into one 
principal component according to Bharath et al. (2008). In the third scenario, I separate firms 
into those with sufficient interest coverage (i.e., interest coverage ratio > 1.5) and those with 
insufficient interest coverage. In all three tests, two consistent results manifest. First, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Bharath et al. (2008) also include loan maturity as a loan term. I exclude it because when conducting untabulated 
factor analysis of the three loan terms used in that study, I find that maturity loads in the same direction as loan 
spread and collateralization despite preference working in the opposite direction (i.e., higher maturity is more 
preferable) indicating that it may represent a different construct. I instead include maturity as a control variable. 
5	  
	  
association between analysts’ precision and loan spread remains constant. Second, analysts’ 
precision is only associated with the likelihood of collateral when the firm is of low type with 
respect to these three characteristics (i.e., no investment-grade credit rating, low accruals quality, 
insufficient interest coverage). 
In the period before Reg FD, analysts had private access to management. Because 
potential lenders also have private access to management, I isolate private precision attributable 
to analysts’ processing ability from private precision attributable to the quality of information 
communicated privately by management. I measure the quality of information from management 
by the number of days between fiscal period end and earnings announcement, which prior 
research has found to be associated with the quality of the firm’s accounting information system 
(Brazel and Dang 2008, Jennings et al. 2012, Gallemore and Labro 2013). When including 
private precision and earnings announcement delay in the same regression, both measures are 
associated with preferable loan terms. This result represents the first evidence of an association 
between information system quality on loan contracts, and it complements the literature 
documenting a lower cost of debt for firms with higher disclosure quality ratings (Sengupta 
1998). 
Because Reg FD changed the information environment for analysts, as well as firms 
(Heflin et al. 2003), I split my sample into two periods (i.e., 1994-2000 and 2001-2006) and test 
each period separately. Similar to the prior cross-sectional tests, here again, I find that the 
association between analysts’ private precision and loan spread is robust while the association 
between analysts’ private precision and collateral loses significance following Reg FD. With 
respect to earnings announcement delay, I find that its association with loan spread is also 
constant in both periods, whereas both the magnitude and significance of the association between 
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this proxy for quality of information from management and collateral increases following Reg 
FD. 
Finally, I investigate the effect of another shock (i.e., financial crisis). Using all loans 
issued during 2007-2009, I find that the precision of analysts’ private information is not 
associated with loan terms. This result is consistent with banks changing their loan pricing 
models, as well as the model inputs, during the financial crisis at a time when analysts’ 
information-processing abilities were affected by the overall increase in uncertainty (Arand and 
Kerl 2012, Amiram et al. 2013).2 The association between earnings announcement delay and 
loan terms again increases in magnitude relative to the pre-crisis period (i.e. the post-Reg FD 
period), but the difference in coefficients is not significant at conventional levels. 
The results of these cross-sectional and longitudinal tests may also have implications for 
internal validity. Because the regressions are associative in nature, the correlations may be 
evidence of reverse causality, in which case information generated by the lending process would 
allow analysts to issue more precise forecasts. However, a decrease in the association between 
analysts’ precision and loan terms after Reg FD and during the financial crisis—times when 
analysts lost access to information sources—may be more consistent with banks not relying on 
analysts’ forecasts, than analysts no longer learning from loans. Furthermore, a stronger 
association between analysts’ precision and loan terms for firms with insufficient interest 
coverage also seems more consistent with banks learning from analysts than vice versa. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This inference is also supported by statements from banking executives that erroneous modeling assumptions 
masked the true level of risk in loan portfolios. 
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CHAPTER 2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
A large body of literature in accounting, economics and finance investigates the agency 
issues of debt. Smith and Warner (1979) build on analytical models by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers (1977) and identify three forms of incentive misalignment between 
managers/shareholders and creditors. First, managers can increase dividends and thereby 
decrease resources available for repayment. Second, managers can issue additional debt which 
may subordinate existing claims. Third, managers may risk-shift by investing in assets with more 
volatile payouts or forego projects with positive net present values when in distress. 
Creditors will make lending decisions based on a rational anticipation of these agency 
conflicts which increase the cost of debt (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Armstrong et al. 2010), but 
research has shown that accounting information, as well as governance, can mitigate agency 
concerns in the debt market (Watts 2003). 
Sell-side analysts represent a source of accounting information. Although unanimity does 
not exist in the early literature, research has provided evidence that analysts’ forecasts are 
superior to time-series models of earnings (e.g. Brown and Rozeff 1978, Fried and Givoly 1982, 
Brown et al. 1987). Schipper (1991) finds this result intuitive because analysts have access to 
additional information not impounded into mechanical models, as well as the models themselves. 
Schipper goes on to explain that prior research has found a stronger association between market 
response and analysts’ forecasts than market response and forecasts using mathematical models. 
Despite this stronger co-movement, analyst forecasts also provide information not already 
impounded in price (Lys and Sohn 1990, Abarbanell 1991). 
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With respect to information precision, Fried and Givoly (1982) find a stronger price 
response to more accurate analysts’ forecasts. This evidence is consistent with Loh and Mian 
(2006), who observe that analysts who issue more accurate forecasts also provide more profitable 
recommendations because although the stock recommendation itself is the ultimate output of an 
analyst report, both buy-side and sell-side analysts rely on sell-side analyst earnings forecasts in 
making recommendations (Schipper 1991, Bradshaw 2004). This evidence leads to my first 
hypothesis: 
H1a: Loans to borrowers with higher private precision of analysts’ forecasts have 
lower interest rate spreads. 
H1b: Loans to borrowers with higher private precision of analysts’ forecasts have a 
lower likelihood of collateralization. 
In addition to their expertise and information-processing methods, analysts obtain 
necessary forecast inputs directly from management (Schipper 1991). Prior to the introduction of 
Reg FD, managers were able to communicate this information privately to analysts. 
Consequently, during that time period the precision of private information in analysts’ forecasts 
was, in part, a function of the quality of information provided by managers. 
Prior research finds evidence consistent with banks using the borrower’s private 
information in lending decisions. Bharath et al. (2008) conclude that the preference of firms with 
poorer accounting quality to access the private debt market is attributable, in part, to banks’ 
ability to impound private information into the lending contract. Furthermore, firms with low 
accounting quality have more proximate lenders (Wang 2011) because the ability to access the 
borrower’s private information increases with the proximity of the lender (Hauswald and 
Marquez 2006). 
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Mansi et al. (2011) assert that analyst forecast quality is associated with bond spreads 
because analysts provide outsiders with information. Unlike bondholders, banks are not 
outsiders, but rather have private access to management. As a result, banks may not need to rely 
on analyst reports. On the other hand, even after excluding the private information from 
management, analysts’ information processing abilities still represent private information 
analysts have to offer. This logic leads to my next hypothesis: 
H2a: Analysts’ forecasts with more precise information-processing are associated with 
preferable loan terms. 
H2b: Analysts’ forecasts with more precise information from management are 
associated with preferable loan terms. 
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CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 My sample begins with the set of sole lender and syndicated loans issued in the United 
States in US$ from the Dealscan database for the years 1994-20133. Syndicated loans are by far 
the most common form of loan with 80% of all loan facilities in Dealscan. Other than club deals, 
which involve private equity firms and not banks, sole lender loans are the second most frequent 
distribution method with 5% of all facilities. I restrict my sample to these two methods because 
they represent good coverage of the database while excluding bonds and loans issued by non-
bank institutions (e.g., private equity, insurance agencies). 
I retain loans to non-financial firms, which I can match to Compustat and I/B/E/S via the 
August 2012 version of the Dealscan-Compustat linking table first introduced by Chava and 
Roberts (2008).4 I require all observations to have non-missing values for loan spread, collateral, 
Compustat and Dealscan control variables and I/B/E/S analyst forecast measures. Finally, I 
exclude all observations with values more extreme than the 1% and 99% for each of the 
continuous regression variables. My final sample includes 9,045 loan facilities from 6,703 loan 
packages issued to 2,279 borrowers. Table 1 Panel A presents the sample selection procedure. 
Table 1 Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the regression variables. The loan 
facilities in my sample have a mean (median) size of $203 million ($215 million) and range 
between $6 million and $3,000 million with mean (median) spread over LIBOR of 122 (150) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I restrict my sample to loans issued after 1993 because of the I/B/E/S regime change in 1991-1992 (Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2007) . 
 
4 I exclude firms with four-digit SIC codes 6000-6999. 
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basis points with a range of 17 to 600 basis points. 44% of the loans are secured with collateral. 
The borrowing firms have a mean (median) of $1,635 million ($1,540 million) of total assets. 
3.1 Analyst Precision and Loan Characteristics 
 I use the following model to test my first hypothesis: 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐! =  𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,!! +𝛼!𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,!! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠!,!! + 𝜀!  (1) 
where Loan characteristic is Loan spread = ln(all-in-spread drawn over LIBOR in basis points) 
or Collateral = 1 if the loan is collateralized and 0, otherwise.5 
Loan controls are Deal size = ln(facility amount), Maturity = ln(months to maturity), 
Financial covenants = number of financial covenants, General covenants = number of general 
covenants, Performance pricing = 1 if the contract includes a performance-pricing provision and 
0, otherwise, Prior lender = 1 if the lender has previously issued a loan facility to the borrower 
and 0, otherwise, as well as a loan type fixed effect.6 
Borrower controls are Size = ln(total assets), Leverage = (long-term debt / total assets), 
BTM = book-value of equity / (fiscal year-end price * common shares outstanding), ROA = 
(income before extraordinary items / total assets), Earnings volatility = stdev(past five years of 
earnings / average total assets) and Interest coverage = 1 if the (interest expense + income before 
extraordinary items) / interest expense is greater than 1.5 and 0, otherwise.7 I use an indicator to 
address the upward skewness and to include firms with no interest expense. Multiple sources 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Whenever Collateral is the dependent variable, I use probit regression. All other specifications use OLS. Greene 
(2004) finds that fixed-effects in probit models induce bias in the maximum likelihood estimator. As a result, I do 
not include fixed effects in my probit models. I check the robustness of this exclusion and find, consistent with 
Greene’s tests, that the coefficients generally increase in magnitude when including fixed effects. 
	  
6	  The fixed effect for loan type is a more general version of the controls in prior literature for whether the loan is a 
revolver, term loan, etc. 
 
7 I calculate independent variables using annual data as of the most recent fiscal year end prior to loan issuance. 
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identify 1.5 as the threshold of healthy interest coverage. Additional fixed effects for this model 
beyond those listed under loan controls are year and four-digit SIC industry. Standard errors are 
clustered at the borrowing-firm level.8 
Several studies have found that opaque firms experience adverse lending outcomes with 
respect to loan spreads and collateralization (e.g., Chan and Kanatas 1985, Sengupta 1998, 
Anderson et al. 2004, Wittenberg-Moerman 2008). However, Sufi (2007) observes that firms 
become more known as they repeatedly access the debt market, which counteracts opacity. 
Based on this evidence, I predict that Prior lender will be negatively correlated with Loan spread 
and Collateral. I include the other loan controls to address the simultaneity of the determination 
of characteristics on the loan contract. To the extent that individual loan terms play a substitute 
role in reducing risk, these controls will be negatively correlated with Loan spread and 
Collateral. 
Risk of default, and thereby, cost of debt (Fisher 1959), is decreasing in firm size and 
profitability and increasing in leverage (Ohlson 1980). Furthermore, value-stocks have higher 
probability of default than growth-stocks (Vassalou and Xing 2004). Prior research has also 
found that the occurrence of collateralization is tied to default risk (Orgler 1970, Berger and 
Udell 1990). As a result, I predict that Size, ROA and Interest coverage will be negatively 
correlated with Loan spread and Collateral and that Leverage and BTM will be positively 
correlated with these loan terms. 
I also include Investment  = 1 if the borrower’s most recent S&P credit rating prior to the 
loan issuance is BBB- or higher and 0, otherwise, and Noninvestment = 1 if the credit rating is 
below BBB- and 0, otherwise. Credit analysts represent the primary information intermediary for 
the debt market, and research has shown that both having a credit rating (Sufi 2007) and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In untabulated results, I also cluster at the firm-year level. Inferences remain unchanged. 
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value of that rating affect the cost of debt. I use indicators to combine the effects of having a 
credit rating with the magnitude of the rating by setting both indicators to 0 for firms without a 
rating. 
Bharath et al. (2008) investigate the effect of accruals quality and loan characteristics and 
find that firms with low accounting quality are more likely to issue private rather than public 
debt and that higher accounting quality is associated with more favorable loan characteristics 
when seeking either public or private debt. Wang (2011) finds that firms with higher accounting 
quality can obtain loans from less proximate banks. These studies indicate that financial 
reporting quality may reduce the information risk that banks face when constructing loan 
packages.  
Because of these findings, I include a measure of financial reporting quality as calculated 
in Bharath et al. (2008) as an additional control variable. Bharath et al. are not the first to 
investigate the link between financial reporting and the cost of debt (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002, 
Francis et al. 2005) nor is their measure of accruals quality widely used, but I adopt their method 
for two reasons. First, my research question and setting are most similar to theirs, and second, as 
the authors of the original study observe, a factor of multiple measures is a parsimonious way of 
capturing commonality among several representations of accruals quality. 
Bharath et al. begin with three existing models for calculating abnormal accruals: 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), Teoh et al. (1998) and a modified Jones model from Dechow et al. 
(1995). They calculate the residual (i.e., abnormal accruals) from the three regressions for each 
year by Fama-French 48 industry. After transforming the residual into its absolute value, Bharath 
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et al. condense the three variables into one factor. I follow this same pattern and obtain a factor 
with the following loadings9: 𝐴𝑄 = .33 ∗ 𝑈𝐴𝐴!! + .68 ∗ 𝑈𝐴𝐴!"" + .64 ∗ 𝑈𝐴𝐴!" (2) 
Private precision is calculated using the log form of the model of precision of analysts’ 
private information from Barron et al. (1998), as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = log   𝐷1− 1𝑁 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝑆𝐸 ! (3) 
where D is forecast dispersion (i.e., forecast variance), SE is the squared forecast error and N is 
the number of forecasts. The use of the log form addresses skewness in the measure (Botosan et 
al. 2004). 
Little theoretical research exists that derives proxies for analyst uncertainty. Many studies 
have used analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for investor uncertainty (e.g., Hughes and Ricks 
1987, Daley et al. 1988, Ziebart 1990, Imhoff and Lobo 1992, Atiase and Bamber 1994, Lang 
and Lundholm 1996), but Abarbanell et al. (1995) observe that forecast dispersion measures the 
precision of investors’ information with error because of the presence of other relevant forecast 
attributes. They develop a model of analyst forecast precision using forecast dispersion, forecast 
error and analyst following. Barron et al. (1998) extend this model to measure the precision of 
analysts’ public and private information. By assumption, public information is available to other 
market participants, and research has already investigated the effects of public information on 
cost of debt (e.g., Sengupta 1998, Bharath et al. 2008, Zhang 2008). Private information, on the 
other hand, is unique to the analyst and can allow me to capture information content that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although my loadings are not identical to those in the original study, because all three measures load in the same 
direction and because the first factor is the only factor with an eigenvalue greater than one as in the original study, I 
am confident that we are capturing similar constructs. 
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unique to the analysts’ reports, which is why I select this model for my measure of the precision 
of analysts’ private information.10 
It is observable from Equation (3) that Private precision is decreasing in squared forecast 
error and forecast dispersion and increasing in analyst following. As the theory predicts, the 
correlations between precision and both squared error and dispersion are negative (𝜌 = -0.09 and 
-0.11, respectively) and the correlation between precision and following is positive (𝜌 = 0.11). 
To test H1, I regress each of the two loan characteristics individually on Private 
precision. Because higher values of each of the dependent variables are less favorable, I predict 
that the 𝛼! coefficient from Equation (1) will be negative for each dependent variable. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics for this measure unscaled, but when including it in any regression I 
scale the variable by its pooled standard deviation so that the coefficient is interpretable as the 
change in a loan term with a one standard deviation change in analyst precision. 
Cross-sectional Tests 
 I then extend this main test to investigate cross-sectional changes in the association 
between analysts’ private precision and loan terms using three separate cuts of the data based on 
credit rating, accruals quality and interest coverage. 11 
In addition to credit rating being a relevant determinant of loan terms, the relation 
between analyst precision and loan terms may vary as a function of credit rating. To investigate 
this possibility, I recalculate the coefficients in Equation (1) separately for those firms with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Analysts’ private information comprises information generated by the analysts’ information processing abilities, 
as well as information communicated privately by management. Because I want to measure the first source of 
private information directly, I address the measurement of the second source in a later section.	  
	  
11	  As an alternative to splitting the sample it would be possible to interact Private precision with indicators for the 
various levels. Although such interactions would be interpretable in an OLS regression, difficulties arise for a probit 
regression (Ai and Norton 2003). Furthermore, such an interaction assumes that the coefficients over the control 
variables are the same for both groups, and I do not have an ex ante prediction that this is the case. 
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investment-grade credit rating prior to loan issuance and those without an investment-grade 
rating. By grouping firms with a non-investment-grade rating together with firms with no credit 
rating, this test combines the effect of low credit quality with the effect of a lack of alternative 
signals on the association between analysts’ precision and loan terms.12 The two subsequent tests 
attempt to isolate each effect separately. 
Because the role of analysts as information intermediaries is ostensibly to reduce 
information risk—as is the role of financial reporting—the precision of analysts’ forecasts and 
the quality of financial reporting may act as substitutes. Prior research finds some evidence of 
substitutability between these two information sources in the equity markets. DeFond and Hung 
(2003) find that analysts are more likely to issue supplementary cash flow forecasts when firms 
have more opaque financial reporting. Lobo et al. (2012) also look at firm accruals and conclude 
that analyst coverage increases as accruals quality decreases. Furthermore, Lobo et al. 
specifically find that analysts’ private precision increases as accruals quality decreases. 
For this test I split my sample into two groups based on whether the value of Accruals 
quality, as defined previously, is above or below the median value pooled across the entire 
sample and calculate the 𝛼 coefficients in Equation (1) separately for each group. Because 
accruals quality measures the opacity of financial reporting, this test investigates the association 
between analysts’ precision and loan terms when an alternative signal is less informative. 
Unlike equity holders whose gains on investment have no upper bound, debt holders do 
not experience upside benefits, but rather focus on borrowers’ ability to pay interest and repay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  I choose to group non-investment grade firms with firms with no credit rating because the reasons for belonging to 
the group without a credit rating are less clear. Firms may have no credit rating because they have never issued 
public debt, because they have not issued public debt in the recent past, because the dataset is not perfectly 
populated, etc. Although I do not tabulate them, I also investigate the results of this test using three groups (i.e., 
investment grade, non-investment grade and no credit rating) and find that the latter two groups have coefficients of 
similar magnitude and significance.	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principal. As a result, banks may be less likely to need additional information when lending to 
healthy, low-risk firms. I investigate the effect of financial health on my main results by splitting 
the sample into loans to firms with an interest coverage ratio greater than 1.5 and loans to firms 
with an interest coverage ratio below 1.5. This test focuses on the implications of credit quality 
for the association between analysts’ precision and loan terms. 
For each of these tests, I predict that the high-type firm (i.e., investment-grade credit 
rating, high accruals quality and good interest coverage) will derive less benefit from forecast 
precision than the low-type firm. 
3.2 Private Information from Management 
Equation (1) measures the association between analysts’ private precision and loan terms. 
However, as previously observed, analysts’ private information has two sources. The first is the 
analyst’s ability to generate private information by means of proprietary information-processing 
mechanisms. The second is firm information, which management privately communicates to the 
analyst. Both inputs contribute to the information content of analysts’ reports, but only the 
former is unique to analysts in a private debt setting because banks also have private access to 
management. As a result, 𝛼! from Equation (1) may capture the correlation between quality of 
information supplied by management and loan terms, as well as the correlation between 
information-processing precision and loan terms. 
To distinguish between these two sources of precision, I include a proxy for the portion 
attributable to the precision of information from management. Prior research has used the 
number of days between the fiscal period end and earnings announcement date as a measure of 
the quality of firm internal information (Brazel and Dang 2008, Jennings et al. 2012, Gallemore 
and Labro 2013). Jennings et al. (2012) assert that more sophisticated accounting systems allow 
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the firm to release earnings numbers more quickly, in part because of the ability to avoid 
inefficiencies in data storage and manipulation. Brazel and Dang (2008) find that earnings 
announcement delay decreases following an ERP implementation, and Gallemore and Labro 
(2013) find that firms with lower earnings announcement delay have more successful tax 
outcomes. I prefer this proxy because it is available for the entirety of my sample period and only 
results in minimal sample size attrition.13 
To test my second hypothesis, I modify Equation (1) to include earnings announcement 
delay as a measure of the quality of information from management: 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐴  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑! +𝛽!𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,!! +𝛽!𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠!,!! + 𝜀!  (4) 
where EA speed = (-1) * log(earnings announcement date - fiscal period end date). Because 
higher values of Private precision indicate higher quality, I multiply earnings announcement 
delay by -1 to obtain a similar interpretation.14 Jennings et al. (2012) use raw count (in days) for 
this variable. I follow Jennings et al. but apply a log transformation to address skewness I 
observe in my sample. As with Private precision, Table 1 reports unscaled statistics for EA 
speed, but when including it in this regression, I scale the variable by its standard deviation to 
bring the interpretation of the coefficient 𝛾! in line with the interpretation of 𝛾!. 
In Equation (4), 𝛽! captures the association between loan terms and analysts’ 
information-processing abilities while 𝛽! measures the association between loan terms and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Management forecasts is an alternative proxy, but its inclusion results in a more than 90% reduction in sample 
size. Furthermore, because almost all of the remaining observations are between 2001 and 2006, I would not be able 
to investigate the effects of Reg FD and the financial crisis as described later in this study. 
	  
14	  Because I scale earnings announcement delay by -1, I adopt the variable name coined by Gallemore and Labro: 
‘EA speed’. 
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quality of management’s information to include the information which management may 
privately supply to analysts. Because better internal information leads to lower information 
asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm 1996), better financial outcomes (Gallemore and Labro 2013) 
and lower monitoring costs (Armstrong et al. 2010), I predict that 𝛽! will be negative for each 
loan characteristic. Consistent with H1, I also predict that 𝛽! will continue to be negative. 
3.3 Shocks 
All tests up to this point have included the entire sample period. I extend these main 
findings by identifying one regulatory shock (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure) and one economic 
shock (i.e., the recent financial crisis) to analysts’ information environment and investigating the 
impact of these shocks on the relation between analysts’ precision and loan terms. 
Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Since Reg FD, in order for management to communicate information to analysts, they 
have been obliged to disclose that information publicly. Heflin et al. (2003) document an 
increase in voluntary disclosure and Mohanram and Sunder (2006) find that the precision of 
public information in analysts’ forecasts remains constant following Reg FD. These studies 
provide evidence that analysts continued to have access to relevant information for forming 
forecasts and recommendations despite the restriction on private communication, but they do not 
agree on the consequences of this regulation for the quality of analysts’ forecasts. Mohanram and 
Sunder (2006) find that the precision of private information in analysts’ forecasts increases and 
conclude that increased information discovery enhances analysts’ ability to convert public 
information into private information; Heflin et al. (2003) find no change with respect to analyst 
forecast quality; and Amiram et al. (2012) assert that the ability of analysts’ forecasts to reduce 
information asymmetry in the equity market decreases following Reg FD. 
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Additionally, firms with higher disclosure quality have a lower cost of debt (Sengupta 
1998). If the benefits of added voluntary disclosure following Reg FD complement the benefits 
of a reduction in information asymmetry from banks having private access to higher quality 
information, then the quality of information provided by management may be more important for 
setting loan terms since the introduction of that regulation. 
For this test I split my sample into two groups, and using Equation (4) I measure 𝛽! and 𝛽! separately for each group. I identify 1994-2000 as the pre-Reg FD period and 2001-2006 as 
the post-Reg FD period.15 I end the post-Reg FD period in 2006 to avoid including the financial 
crisis. Based on prior literature 𝛽! may increase, decrease or remain constant, but I predict that 𝛽! will increase in absolute value in the post-Reg FD period. 
Financial Crisis 
Unlike Reg FD, because of the universal increase in uncertainty, the financial crisis likely 
affected analysts’ access to relevant information inputs. Because analyst forecasts decreased in 
quality (Arand and Kerl 2012, Amiram et al. 2013) after the start of the crisis, lenders may have 
relied on them less. However, these studies also observe that the market’s response to analysts’ 
forecasts increased consistent with analysts continuing to be able to provide information because 
of the lack of alternative sources. Banks, unlike other market participants, do have an alternative 
source of information through private access to management and may have instead shifted 
toward increased reliance on information from management. 
Because the post-Reg FD period is also the pre-financial-crisis period, in this test I 
compare the years of the crisis with the post-Reg FD period. Based on information from the St. 
Louis Fed, I identify 2007 as the start of the crisis, and I include all loans issued through the end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The difference in starting years between this and earlier tests is attributable to sample attrition when adding 
additional independent variables. 
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of 2009. I then re-estimate Equation (4) for this sub-sample. Here again, prior literature does not 
allow for a clear prediction for the change in 𝛽! following the start of the crisis. Banks’ reliance 
on analysts’ forecasts may have decreased because of a drop in precision, or it may have 
increased because of a drop in the availability of other sources of information. My prediction for 𝛽! is also consistent with that from the post-Reg FD period. Because of the increase in 
uncertainty following the start of the crisis, I predict that banks would choose to rely even more 
on information provided by management. As a result, I predict that 𝛽! will be negative for each 
loan term and larger in absolute value than in the period before the crisis. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 Table 1 Panel C displays univariate Pearson and Spearman correlations of the regression 
variables. All firm characteristics are also correlated with the loan terms in the predicted 
direction (i.e., larger, more profitable, less highly leveraged firms with higher credit ratings have 
preferable loan terms). Private precision and EA speed are positively correlated with one another 
(𝜌 = 0.09) indicating that the underlying constructs may be related. The low correlation also 
indicates that these measures do not capture identical constructs. Loan spread and Collateral are 
also positively correlated with one another (𝜌 = 0.53) and negatively correlated with Private 
precision and EA speed with correlations between -0.09 and -0.37. The correlations between loan 
terms and EA speed are larger in absolute value than the correlations between loan terms and 
Private precision, which may imply that the quality of information provided by management is a 
stronger determinant of loan contracts than the precision of analysts’ information-processing 
abilities. Although it is intuitive that private access to the borrowing firm is an important source 
of information when setting loan terms, analysts may still be able to provide relevant, 
incremental information. 
Table 2 presents the results of the test of H1 using Equation (1). For both dependent 
variables the coefficient over Private precision is negative and significant at higher than the 1% 
level. A one standard deviation increase in precision corresponds to a 5 basis point decrease in 
loan spread and a 7% decrease in the likelihood of posting collateral. These results indicate that 
analyst forecast quality is associated with preferential treatment with respect to both price (i.e., 
spread) and non-price (i.e., collateral) loan characteristics, which finding is consistent with 
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Mansi et al. (2011), who conclude that analyst forecast quality is negatively associated with the 
price of bonds. 
Table 3 presents the results of three cross-sectional tests. For parsimony in presentation, I 
have only included the coefficient over Private precision in each case. Panel A shows the results 
of splitting the sample by whether the borrowing firm had an investment-grade credit rating prior 
to the loan issuance; Panel B shows the results of splitting the sample on the median value of 
accruals quality; and Panel C shows the results of splitting sample by whether the borrowing 
firm has an interest coverage ratio greater than 1.5. In all three tests, two consistent stories 
manifest. With respect to loan spread, the correlation between Private precision and this loan 
term remains constant across all sub-samples. The only noticeable difference in coefficients is 
between those firms with sufficient interest coverage (-0.03) and those without (-0.05), but the 
difference is not significant at conventional levels. This lack of variability may be evidence of 
high levels of complexity surrounding the decision for an interest rate such that additional 
reductions in information asymmetry can always benefit the borrower. On the other hand, the 
relation between analysts’ precision and the likelihood of collateralization seems dependent on 
the availability of other signals and the credit quality of the borrowing firm. In each case, the 
coefficient over Private precision is larger in absolute value for low-type firms and statistically 
insignificant for high-type firms.16  
Table 4 reports the results of H2. Private precision, which, after controlling for the 
quality of information from management, captures the precision of analysts’ information-
processing, remains significantly correlated with both loan terms. EA speed is also negatively 
associated with each loan term, and consistent with the univariate correlations, the coefficients 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  When I split the “Not Investment Grade” group into “Below Investment Grade” and “No Rating”, I find 
coefficients of similar magnitude and significance for each group.	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over EA speed  are larger in absolute value than those for Private precision. This reinforces the 
intuitive inference that private access to the borrowing firm is more relevant for lending 
decisions than information provided by analysts. 
Table 5 reports results for three sub-periods: before Reg FD (columns 1 and 2), after Reg 
FD (columns 3 and 4) and during the financial crisis (columns 5 and 6). The results in columns 1 
and 2 are similar to the results in prior tables and imply that before Reg FD, the precision 
analysts’ information-processing was associated with preferable loan terms. In the periods 
thereafter, banks seem to have ceased relying on information from management. According to 
columns 3 and 4 following Reg FD, Private precision ceases to be correlated with Collateral. 
Furthermore, as shown in columns 5 and 6 during the financial crisis, Private precision ceases to 
be correlated with either loan term. This loss of significance may indicate that a decrease in 
analyst forecast quality decreased banks’ reliance on analysts’ reports or that after the start of the 
crisis banks changed their loan pricing models, as well as the model inputs. 
An opposite result holds for EA speed. The association between EA speed and Loan 
spread remains constant across all periods, while the correlation between EA speed and 
Collateral increases from one period to the next. Prior to Reg FD, EA speed is not correlated 
with Collateral, but the coefficient increases in absolute magnitude and gains statistical 
significance following Reg FD. The coefficient again increases in magnitude during the financial 
crisis. Although the differences are not statistically significant, the trend indicates that banks may 
have increased reliance on communication from management when additional sources of 
information became less reliable and informative. 
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4.1 Robustness Tests 
 The evidence up to this point is consistent with analysts’ forecast quality being correlated 
with loan terms, but I include additional untabulated tests to gauge the robustness of these 
results. 
Outliers 
 Table 1 Panel C displays both parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
Although the univariate Pearson and Spearman correlations between loan terms and analyst 
precision are of similar magnitude, I test for the effects of outliers in two ways. First, I replicate 
my tests using rank regressions. Second, in addition to truncating all continuous variables at 1% 
and 99%, I truncate forecast dispersion, which is one dimension of Private precision, at 1% and 
99%.17 In both cases inferences remain unchanged. 
Analyst Following 
 Prior literature has found an association between analyst following and credit ratings 
(Cheng and Subramanyam 2008). Although I control for credit ratings, I also want to verify that 
the association between analysts’ private precision and loan terms captures more than simply the 
association between analyst following and loan terms. I test this by adding analyst following, as 
well as the other components of Private precision (i.e., forecast dispersion and squared forecast 
error) as control variables and find that Private precision remains correlated with both loan 
terms.  
Omitted Variables 
 Despite the control variables in the hypothesis tests, the results could be affected by other 
correlated omitted variables. It is not feasible to identify all such variables, but a changes 
specification will exclude the effects of any time-invariant omitted variables. In order to be able 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  This truncation addresses outliers, as well as herding behavior among analysts. 
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to calculate changes, the firm must have accessed the private debt market at least twice during 
the sample period. To perform this test, I replace the dependent variables with the change in the 
dependent variables from one loan to the next, and I do the same for Private precision. All 
controls and fixed effects for this model are calculated as of the fiscal period end prior to the 
issuance of the more recent of the two loans. Private precision remains significantly correlated 
with Loan spread and Collateral.18 
 I also test for omitted variables by including each loan term as an independent variable in 
a regression with the other loan term as the dependent variable. Private precision continues to be 
correlated with each loan term when controlling for the other.  
Management Communication 
 I use earnings announcement delay as an attempt to capture the ability of management to 
provide analysts with private information. Although prior research has demonstrated a 
correlation between this proxy and the quality of the firm’s information system, earnings 
announcement delay is a publicly observable measure and instead may capture the effect of 
public information on loan terms. I attempt to address this issue in my main tests by including 
Accruals quality and Earnings volatility as proxies for publicly observable accounting 
information. 
I also perform a robustness test to further address this issue, in which I replace EA delay 
with the change in EA delay.19 To calculate the change I subtract earnings announcement delay 
for the fiscal year end immediately prior to loan issuance from earnings announcement delay for 
the first fiscal year end following loan issuance. Because EA delay following loan issuance is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Because Collateral is an indicator variable, change in Collateral has three levels (i.e., -1, 0, 1). As a result, I use 
ordered probit for this robustness test. 
 
19	  I also try including both EA delay and change in EA delay in the same regression. 
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publicly observable I use the change as an attempt to capture the effects of the information 
system on earnings announcement delay more readily. In both tests inferences are unchanged 
relative to my main results. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This study investigates whether the private precision in analysts’ forecasts is correlated 
with bank loan terms. Using a measure of precision of analysts’ private information from Barron 
et al. (1998), I find that higher precision is associated with lower loan spreads and lower 
likelihood of collateralization. 
I then perform three cross-sectional tests to discover whether this association depends on 
other firm characteristics. For the first test, I separate firms into those with an investment-grade 
credit rating prior to the loan issuance and those without; for the second, I split the sample on the 
median for accruals quality as of the fiscal-year end prior to the loan issuance as measured by 
Bharath et al. (2008); and for the third, I separate firms into those with an interest coverage ratio 
greater than 1.5 and those with an interest coverage ratio less than 1.5 prior to the loan issuance. 
In each case, I find that the association between analysts’ precision and loan spread remains 
constant while the association between analysts’ precision and collateral is only significant for 
low-type firms (i.e., without an investment-grade credit rating, low accruals quality or 
insufficient interest coverage). 
 Because analysts’ private information contains both private information-processing 
ability, as well as private information communicated from management, I select a measure of 
quality of information provided by management (i.e., earnings announcement delay) to separate 
the two parts and regress loan terms on both parts. I find that both components are associated 
with preferable loan terms. 
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I then investigate two shocks. First, Regulation Fair Disclosure affected the ability of 
management to communicate privately with analysts. I investigate the change in the association 
between loan terms and these two components of the precision of analysts’ private information 
after the introduction of Reg FD. I find that while the association between analysts’ precision and 
loan spread remains constant, the correlation between analysts’ precision and collateral ceases to 
be significant. Quality of information provided by management, on the other hand, increases in 
importance in the post period with respect to collateralization. 
The second shock is the financial crisis. When observing loans during the years 2007-
2009, I find that analysts’ forecast quality is no longer correlated with either loan term consistent 
with overwhelming uncertainty in the market regarding asset values prompting a change in loan 
pricing models. As with the post-Reg FD period, information from management again increased 
in importance following the start of the crisis. I conclude that banks may have responded to the 
increase in uncertainty by increasing reliance on private communications with management. 
 My study has several limitations. First, all tests are conditional. I can only observe 
accepted loan terms of approved loans. This limits the external validity of my study because I do 
not know the nature of firms who did not receive loans. Second, the study is associative in 
nature. This is a first attempt at understanding the existence of a tie between analysts’ forecast 
quality and the cost of private debt, and I am not able to establish causality.20 The decision to 
measure analyst forecast quality before loan issuance, as well as the changes model, are attempts 
to rule out reverse causality (i.e., that preferable loan terms result in higher analyst forecast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  A recent study by Ergungor et al. (2014) states that the accuracy of the forecasts by analysts affiliated with a bank, 
with which the covered firm has a prior lending relationship, is higher than those of unaffiliated analysts. Because 
F/I/S/D does not disclose the names of analysts and brokers, I cannot identify which analysts are affiliated with 
lending banks, but I attempt to address this issue in two ways. First, because I use summary forecasts with a 
minimum of three estimates, individual analysts should have undue influence on the main findings. Second, I control 
for the existence of a lending relationship, which according to this prior study, represents a proxy for the higher 
accuracy of forecasts by affiliated analysts. 	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quality). The results of the cross-sectional tests and the tests of the effects of Reg FD and the 
financial crisis also seem consistent with the assertion that banks are learning from analysts. 
Finally, I am not able to measure the quality of information from management directly and select 
earnings announcement delay because prior studies have found it to be correlated with firm 
information system quality. Future investigation into measures of management information 
quality can allow for more direct identification of the effect of a borrower’s private information 
on loan terms. 
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TABLES 
	  
  
Panel	  A:	  Sample	  selection	  procedure
Facilities Packages Borrowers
Sample	  of	  loans	  issued	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  in	  United	  States	  Dollars 105,067 72,432 28,268
Sample	  after	  requiring	  Dealscan	  variables 75,869 51,197 20,611
Sample	  of	  loans	  matched	  with	  Compustat 40,691 28,725 8,248
Sample	  after	  excluding	  financial	  firms 35,515 24,520 7,027
Sample	  after	  requiring	  Compustat	  variables 18,310 12,888 4,014
Sample	  after	  requiring	  IBES	  variables 10,783 7,891 2,573
Sample	  after	  removing	  outliers	  of	  continuous	  variables 9,045 6,703 2,279
Panel	  B:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  model	  variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.	  Dev. Min. 25% Median 75% Max.
Loan	  spread 9,045 4.81 0.80 2.86 4.32 5.01 5.42 6.40
Collateral 9,045 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Private	  precision 9,045 4.11 3.22 -­‐6.93 2.08 4.59 6.52 9.57
EA	  speed 9,045 -­‐3.64 0.35 -­‐4.52 -­‐3.91 -­‐3.66 -­‐3.37 -­‐2.71
Deal	  size 9,045 19.13 1.21 15.52 18.42 19.19 20.03 21.82
Maturity 9,045 3.69 0.65 1.79 3.56 4.09 4.09 4.58
Financial	  covenants 9,045 1.72 1.52 0 0 2 3 8
General	  covenants 9,045 4.38 3.62 0 0 4 8 10
Performance	  pricing 9,045 0.56 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Prior	  lender 9,045 0.76 0.43 0 1 1 1 1
Size 9,045 7.40 1.50 4.08 6.31 7.34 8.47 10.97
Leverage 9,045 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.37 0.93
BTM 9,045 0.50 0.33 -­‐0.38 0.28 0.44 0.65 2.05
ROA 9,045 0.04 0.06 -­‐0.33 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.23
Earnings	  volatility 9,045 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.31
Accruals	  quality 9,045 0.12 0.41 -­‐2.72 0.04 0.24 0.36 0.48
Interest	  coverage 9,045 0.74 0.44 0 0 1 1 1
Investment	  grade 9,045 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Noninvestment	  grade 9,045 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
TABLE	  1
Sample	  selection,	  descriptive	  statistics	  and	  correlations	  for	  sample	  years	  1994-­‐2012.
All	  sample	  restrictions	  apply	  to	  the	  borrowing	  firm.
Number	  of	  observations
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Dependent	  variables
log(all-­‐in-­‐spread	  drawn	  over	  LIBOR	  in	  basis	  points)
1	  if	  the	  loan	  is	  collateralized	  and	  0,	  otherwise
Independent	  variable	  of	  interest
Prediction Loan	  Spread Collateral
Intercept 6.15 -­‐0.91
(32.8) (-­‐2.1)
Private	  Precision -­‐ -­‐0.04 -­‐0.07
(-­‐4.9) (-­‐3.0)
Deal	  Size -­‐0.07 -­‐0.05
(-­‐6.8) (-­‐1.7)
Maturity -­‐0.05 0.39
(-­‐2.4) (10.1)
Financial	  Covenants 0.02 0.11
(2.7) (5.4)
General	  Covenants 0.03 0.17
(8.1) (20.0)
Performance	  Pricing -­‐0.10 -­‐0.18
(-­‐6.0) (-­‐3.5)
Prior	  Lender -­‐0.04 0.00
(-­‐2.5) (0.1)
Size -­‐0.11 -­‐0.11
(-­‐9.2) (-­‐3.7)
Leverage 0.52 0.43
(9.0) (2.8)
BTM 0.24 0.29
(9.0) (4.0)
ROA -­‐0.99 -­‐2.41
(-­‐6.2) (-­‐5.3)
Earnings	  Volatility 0.46 3.30
(2.5) (6.0)
Accruals	  Quality -­‐0.07 -­‐0.11
(-­‐3.1) (-­‐1.9)
Interest	  Coverage -­‐0.07 -­‐0.05
(-­‐3.3) (-­‐0.9)
Investment -­‐0.16 -­‐0.58
(-­‐4.9) (-­‐6.5)
Noninvestment 0.20 0.17
(8.5) (2.6)
Observations 9,045 9,045
Adjusted	  R-­‐square 0.69 0.38
Loan	  Spread	  =
Collateral	  =
Private	  Precision	  = f(squared	  forecast	  error	  (SE),	  forecast	  dispersion	  (D)	  
and	  analyst	  following	  (N))
Dependent	  Variable
TABLE	  2
This	  table	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  regressing	  two	  loan	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  spread	  and	  collateralization)	  on	  the	  
precision	  of	  analysts'	  private	  information	  (Barron	  et	  al.	  1998),	  loan-­‐	  and	  borrower-­‐specific	  controls	  and	  year,	  
loan	  type	  and	  four-­‐digit	  SIC	  industry	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  years	  1994	  through	  2012.	  All	  variables	  are	  calculated	  
as	  of	  the	  fiscal-­‐year	  end	  prior	  to	  loan	  issuance.Standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  borrowing	  firm	  level.	  T-­‐
statistics	  (Z-­‐statistics)	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses.
log 𝐷1− 1𝑁 ∗ 𝐷 +𝑆𝐸 ,
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Dependent	  variables
log(all-­‐in-­‐spread	  drawn	  over	  LIBOR	  in	  basis	  points)
1	  if	  the	  loan	  is	  collateralized	  and	  0,	  otherwise
Independent	  variable	  of	  interest
f(squared	  forecast	  error	  (SE),	  forecast	  dispersion	  (D)	  and	  analyst	  following	  (N))
Panel	  A:	  Credit	  rating
Loan	  Spread Collateral Loan	  Spread Collateral
Private	  Precision -­‐0.04 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.08
(-­‐2.8) (-­‐0.5) (-­‐3.6) (-­‐3.1)
Observations
Panel	  B:	  Accruals	  quality
Loan	  Spread Collateral Loan	  Spread Collateral
Private	  Precision -­‐0.04 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.09
(-­‐3.8) (-­‐1.1) (-­‐4.1) (-­‐3.0)
Observations
Panel	  C:	  Interest	  coverage
Loan	  Spread Collateral Loan	  Spread Collateral
Private	  Precision -­‐0.03 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.16
(-­‐2.7) (-­‐1.0) (-­‐3.3) (-­‐4.2)
Observations 6,658 2,387
AQ	  Above	  the	  Median AQ	  Below	  the	  Median
4,523 4,522
Investment	  Grade Not	  Investment	  Grade
3,023 6,022
Coverage	  >	  1.5 Coverage	  <	  1.5
Loan	  Spread	  =
Collateral	  =
Private	  Precision	  =
TABLE	  3
This	  table	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  regressing	  two	  loan	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  spread	  and	  collateralization)	  on	  the	  
precision	  of	  analysts'	  private	  information	  (Barron	  et	  al.	  1998),	  earnings	  announcement	  delay,	  loan-­‐	  and	  borrower-­‐
specific	  controls	  and	  year,	  loan	  type	  and	  four-­‐digit	  SIC	  industry	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  years	  1994	  through	  2012.	  All	  
variables	  are	  calculated	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal-­‐year	  end	  prior	  to	  loan	  issuance.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  borrowing	  
firm	  level.	  T-­‐statistics	  (Z-­‐statistics)	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses.	  Each	  panel	  reports	  only	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  
independent	  variable	  of	  interest.	  Panel	  A	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  splitting	  the	  sample	  into	  firms	  with	  and	  without	  an	  
investment-­‐grade	  credit	  rating.	  Panel	  B	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  splitting	  the	  sample	  into	  firms	  with	  accruals	  quality	  
(Bharath	  et	  al.	  2008)	  above	  and	  below	  the	  median.	  Panel	  C	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  splitting	  the	  sample	  into	  firms	  with	  
an	  interest	  coverage	  ratio	  greater	  than	  and	  less	  than	  1.5.
log 𝐷1− 1𝑁 ∗ 𝐷 +𝑆𝐸 ,
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Dependent	  variables
log(all-­‐in-­‐spread	  drawn	  over	  LIBOR	  in	  basis	  points)
1	  if	  the	  loan	  is	  collateralized	  and	  0,	  otherwise
Independent	  variable	  of	  interest
EA	  Speed	  =
Prediction Loan	  Spread Collateral
Intercept 5.46 -­‐2.57
(22.8) (-­‐5.0)
Private	  Precision -­‐ -­‐0.04 -­‐0.06
(-­‐4.6) (-­‐2.6)
EA	  Speed -­‐ -­‐0.06 -­‐0.17
(-­‐5.1) (-­‐6.5)
Deal	  Size -­‐0.07 -­‐0.06
(-­‐6.8) (-­‐2.1)
Maturity -­‐0.05 0.36
(-­‐2.3) (9.4)
Financial	  Covenants 0.02 0.11
(2.6) (5.1)
General	  Covenants 0.03 0.17
(8.0) (19.9)
Performance	  Pricing -­‐0.10 -­‐0.16
(-­‐5.9) (-­‐3.2)
Prior	  Lender -­‐0.04 -­‐0.00
(-­‐2.3) (-­‐0.0)
Size -­‐0.10 -­‐0.07
(-­‐7.9) (-­‐2.5)
Leverage 0.51 0.35
(8.8) (2.3)
BTM 0.23 0.25
(8.5) (3.4)
ROA -­‐0.93 -­‐2.20
(-­‐5.8) (-­‐4.9)
Earnings	  Volatility 0.50 3.37
(2.7) (6.0)
Accruals	  Quality -­‐0.06 -­‐0.10
(-­‐2.9) (-­‐1.8)
Interest	  Coverage -­‐0.07 -­‐0.04
(-­‐3.0) (-­‐0.7)
Investment -­‐0.16 -­‐0.56
(-­‐4.9) (-­‐6.3)
Noninvestment 0.20 0.18
(8.3) (2.8)
Observations 9,045 9,045
Adjusted	  R-­‐square 0.69 0.39
(-­‐1)	  *	  log(earnings	  announcement	  date	  -­‐	  fiscal	  
period	  end	  date)
Dependent	  Variable
TABLE	  4
This	  table	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  regressing	  two	  loan	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  spread	  and	  collateralization)	  on	  the	  
precision	  of	  analysts'	  private	  information	  (Barron	  et	  al.	  1998),	  earnings	  announcement	  delay,	  loan-­‐	  and	  
borrower-­‐specific	  controls	  and	  year,	  loan	  type	  and	  four-­‐digit	  SIC	  industry	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  years	  1994	  
through	  2012.	  All	  variables	  are	  calculated	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal-­‐year	  end	  prior	  to	  loan	  issuance.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  
clustered	  at	  the	  borrowing	  firm	  level.	  T-­‐statistics	  (Z-­‐statistics)	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses.
Loan	  Spread	  =
Collateral	  =
Private	  Precision	  = f(squared	  forecast	  error	  (SE),	  forecast	  dispersion	  (D)	  
and	  analyst	  following	  (N))log 𝐷1− 1𝑁 ∗ 𝐷 +𝑆𝐸 ,
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Dependent	  variables
log(all-­‐in-­‐spread	  drawn	  over	  LIBOR	  in	  basis	  points)
1	  if	  the	  loan	  is	  collateralized	  and	  0,	  otherwise
Independent	  variable	  of	  interest
EA	  Speed	  = (-­‐1)	  *	  log(earnings	  announcement	  date	  -­‐	  fiscal	  period	  end	  date)
Loan	  Spread Collateral Loan	  Spread Collateral Loan	  Spread Collateral
Intercept 5.78 0.19 6.22 -­‐1.08 6.05 -­‐2.70
(16.4) (0.2) (14.1) (-­‐1.3) (8.6) (-­‐1.6)
Private	  Precision -­‐0.04 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.05
(-­‐2.8) (-­‐2.3) (-­‐2.2) (-­‐1.1) (-­‐0.8) (-­‐0.9)
EA	  Speed -­‐0.05 -­‐0.07 -­‐0.05 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.15
(-­‐3.3) (-­‐1.6) (-­‐2.8) (-­‐2.6) (-­‐2.0) (-­‐2.2)
Deal	  Size -­‐0.07 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.10 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.08 0.08
(-­‐4.5) (-­‐2.3) (-­‐5.5) (-­‐2.5) (-­‐2.8) (0.9)
Maturity -­‐0.03 0.32 -­‐0.08 0.41 -­‐0.10 0.16
(-­‐1.1) (6.0) (-­‐2.3) (6.3) (-­‐1.5) (1.4)
Financial	  Covenants 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.11 -­‐0.02 0.00
(2.3) (3.7) (0.9) (2.8) (-­‐0.8) (0.1)
General	  Covenants 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.26
(4.1) (12.8) (6.8) (12.8) (3.6) (9.4)
Performance	  Pricing -­‐0.07 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.26 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.14
(-­‐2.6) (-­‐2.5) (-­‐4.7) (-­‐2.7) (-­‐3.3) (-­‐0.9)
Prior	  Lender -­‐0.01 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.19 0.02 -­‐0.47
(-­‐0.5) (-­‐0.8) (-­‐3.0) (-­‐1.9) (0.4) (-­‐2.9)
Size -­‐0.15 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.27
(-­‐7.9) (-­‐3.8) (-­‐3.9) (-­‐1.9) (-­‐2.2) (-­‐2.8)
Leverage 0.58 1.02 0.60 0.23 0.55 0.33
(6.5) (4.3) (5.5) (0.8) (3.6) (0.9)
BTM 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.19
(4.7) (2.8) (4.5) (1.9) (3.9) (1.0)
ROA -­‐0.78 -­‐1.67 -­‐1.33 -­‐2.67 -­‐0.69 -­‐2.91
(-­‐3.0) (-­‐2.2) (-­‐4.8) (-­‐2.9) (-­‐1.5) (-­‐3.1)
Earnings	  Volatility 1.29 3.02 0.25 3.34 -­‐0.54 0.73
(3.5) (2.8) (0.7) (3.3) (-­‐0.9) (0.5)
Accruals	  Quality -­‐0.05 -­‐0.20 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.18 -­‐0.10
(-­‐1.8) (-­‐2.5) (-­‐0.4) (-­‐0.3) (-­‐2.2) (-­‐0.6)
Interest	  Coverage -­‐0.14 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.06 0.01 0.06 0.11
(-­‐3.7) (-­‐2.2) (-­‐1.6) (0.1) (0.9) (0.7)
Investment -­‐0.19 -­‐0.47 -­‐0.27 -­‐0.37 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.04
(-­‐3.5) (-­‐3.4) (-­‐4.8) (-­‐2.6) (-­‐2.0) (-­‐0.2)
Noninvestment 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.26 0.31 0.66
(2.7) (1.9) (3.7) (2.2) (4.6) (4.1)
Observations 3,159 3,159 3,390 3,390 1,154 1,154
Adjusted	  R-­‐square 0.73 0.40 0.73 0.46 0.74 0.40
TABLE	  5
Before	  Reg	  FD After	  Reg	  FD Financial	  Crisis
This	  table	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  regressing	  two	  loan	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  spread	  and	  collateralization)	  on	  
the	  precision	  of	  analysts'	  private	  information	  (Barron	  et	  al.	  1998),	  earnings	  announcement	  delay,	  loan-­‐	  
and	  borrower-­‐specific	  controls	  and	  year,	  loan	  type	  and	  four-­‐digit	  SIC	  industry	  fixed	  effects	  for	  the	  years	  
1994	  through	  2012.	  All	  variables	  are	  calculated	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal-­‐year	  end	  prior	  to	  loan	  issuance.	  Standard	  
errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  borrowing	  firm	  level.	  T-­‐statistics	  (Z-­‐statistics)	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses.	  
Columns	  1	  and	  2	  report	  results	  for	  loans	  issued	  prior	  to	  Reg	  FD	  (before	  2001).	  Columns	  3	  and	  4	  report	  
results	  for	  loans	  issued	  after	  Reg	  FD	  (2001-­‐2006).	  Columns	  5	  and	  6	  report	  results	  for	  loans	  issued	  during	  
the	  financial	  crisis	  (2007-­‐2009).
f(squared	  forecast	  error	  (SE),	  forecast	  dispersion	  (D)	  and	  analyst	  
following	  (N))
Loan	  Spread	  =
Collateral	  =
Private	  Precision	  =
log 𝐷1− 1𝑁 ∗ 𝐷 +𝑆𝐸 ,
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